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Title: Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs

Author(s): Di Guo, Kun Jiang and Cheng-Gang Xu

Publication Date: February 2017

Keyword(s): Chinese Economy, entrepreneurship, Institution, Property rights and Time allocation

Programme Area(s): Development Economics and Industrial Organization

Abstract: This study presents theoretical and empirical analyses of time allocation of entrepreneurs as a response to weak property rights protection. Using a nationwide random sampling survey of more than 3,000 entrepreneurs in over 100 cities in China, we find that entrepreneurs, responding to the violation of property rights, spend large proportions of their working time on lobbying activities to protect their businesses at the cost of management time. Moreover, the sensitivity of lobbying time to property rights protection is reduced if the entrepreneur is politically connected or if the firm is larger or older.

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Bibliographic Reference

Guo, D, Jiang, K and Xu, C. 2017. 'Institutions and Managerial Task Allocation: Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11853