Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP12212 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
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Title: Electoral Systems, Taxation and Immigration Policies: Which System Builds a Wall first?
Author(s): Massimo Morelli, Margherita Negri
Publication Date: August 2017
Keyword(s): Median voter, migration, Occupational choice, Proportional representation, taxation and Walls
Programme Area(s): Public Economics
Abstract: When exposed to similar migration flows, countries with different institutional systems may respond with different levels of openness. We study in particular the different responses determined by different electoral systems. We find that Winner Take All countries would tend to be more open than countries with PR when all other policies are kept constant, but, crucially, if we consider the endogenous differences in redistribution levels across systems, then the openness ranking may switch.
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Morelli, M, Negri, M. 2017. 'Electoral Systems, Taxation and Immigration Policies: Which System Builds a Wall first?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12212