Discussion paper

DP10112 Pre-Auction Inventory and Bidding Behavior?An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions

Many bidders enter the Government of Canada securities auctions with short or long pre-auction inventory. We find that bidding strategies and auction performance vary with pre-auction ownership structure. Short and long bidders bid higher average prices and demand larger quantities than do bidders with neutral pre-auction inventory. The effects of pre-auction ownership on bidder behavior vary with the auction cycle and with uncertainty. We argue that post-auction short squeeze does not explain the observed relation between securities prices and ownership structure.

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Citation

Rydqvist, K and M Wu (2014), ‘DP10112 Pre-Auction Inventory and Bidding Behavior?An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 10112. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp10112