DP11869 Adverse Selection and Assortative Matching in Labor Markets

Author(s): Daniel Ferreira, Radoslawa Nikolowa
Publication Date: February 2017
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Programme Areas: Labour Economics, Financial Economics
Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11869

We show that adverse selection in the labor market may generate negative assortative matching of workers and firms. In a model in which employers asymmetrically learn about the ability of their workers, high-productivity firms poach mediocre workers, whereas low-productivity firms retain high-ability workers. We show that this flipping property is caused by information asymmetry alone. Our model has a number of positive and normative predictions: External promotions are not an indication of high talent, within-job wage growth is higher in industries with more revenue dispersion, and non-compete clauses are inefficient in industries with significant firm heterogeneity.