DP12436 Firm-level political risk: Measurement and effects
|Author(s):||Tarek Hassan, Stephan Hollander, Ahmed Tahoun, Laurence van Lent|
|Publication Date:||November 2017|
|Keyword(s):||firm-level, Lobbying, Political uncertainty, quantification|
|JEL(s):||D80, E22, G18, G38, H32|
|Programme Areas:||Financial Economics, Monetary Economics and Fluctuations, Macroeconomics and Growth|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12436|
We adapt simple tools from computational linguistics to construct a new measure of political risk faced by individual US firms: the share of their quarterly earnings conference calls that they devote to political risks. We validate our measure by showing that it correctly identifies calls containing extensive conversations on risks that are political in nature, that it varies intuitively over time and across sectors, and that it correlates with the firm's actions and stock market volatility in a manner that is highly indicative of political risk. Firms exposed to political risk retrench hiring and investment and actively lobby and donate to politicians. Interestingly, we find that the incidence of political risk across firms is far more heterogeneous and volatile than previously thought. The vast majority of the variation in our measure is at the firm-level rather than at the aggregate or sector-level, in the sense that it is neither captured by time fixed effects and the interaction of sector and time fixed effects, nor by heterogeneous exposure of individual firms to aggregate political risk. The dispersion of this firm-level political risk increases significantly at times with high aggregate political risk. Decomposing our measure of political risk by topic, we find that firms that devote more time to discussing risks associated with a given political topic tend to increase lobbying on that topic, but not on other topics, in the following quarter.