Discussion paper

DP2156 The Politics of Cooptation

Group 1 holds political power. Group 2 threatens this power. Group 1 decreases the upheaval probability by coopting some agents from Group 2 into a more benign Group 3. Improvements in upheaval technology lead to less cooptation. Increasing the relative size of Group 1 implies larger cooptation payments to a smaller group, decreasing the total resources committed to cooptation. In an extension in which Group 3 also threatens Group 1, although less destructively than does Group 2, cooptation transfers are reduced. Growth causes political stabilization. The theory applies to the origin of the welfare state, post-communist privatization and other situations.

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Citation

Spagat, M and G Bertocchi (1999), ‘DP2156 The Politics of Cooptation‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2156. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp2156