DP2572 Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory

Author(s): Paul Klemperer
Publication Date: October 2000
Keyword(s): Auction Theory, Auctions, Bertrand, Bidding, Brand Loyalty, Common Values, E-Commerce, Electricity, Financial Crashes, Litigation, Mechanism Design, Perfect Competition, Private Values, Queues, Spectrum Auctions, Stock Markets, Treasury Auctions, War Of Attrition
JEL(s): D42, D43, D44, D45, G14, K41, L13, L81, L94, L96
Programme Areas: Industrial Organization
Link to this Page: www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2572

This is a preliminary draft of an Invited Symposium paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society to be held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and 'standard' economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful argument and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.