DP3469 Assortative Matching in a Non-transferable World
|Author(s):||Patrick Legros, Andrew Newman|
|Publication Date:||July 2002|
|Keyword(s):||assortative matching, contract theory, principal agent|
|JEL(s):||D51, I22, J41|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=3469|
Progress in the application of matching models to environments in which the utility between matching partners is not fully transferable has been hindered by a lack of characterization results analogous to those that are known for transferable utility. We present sufficient conditions for matching to be monotone that are simple to express and easy to verify. We illustrate their application with some examples that are of independent interest.