DP4899 Demand Reduction and Pre-emptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions
|Author(s):||Jacob K. Goeree, Theo Offerman, Randolph Sloof|
|Publication Date:||February 2005|
|Keyword(s):||demand reduction, external effects, multi-license auctions|
|JEL(s):||C91, D44, D45|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=4899|
Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and pre-emptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry by the newcomer imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and efficiency, while the two auction formats offer similar chances for newcomers to enter the market.