Discussion paper

DP7331 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.

£6.00
Citation

Schmitz, P and E Hoppe (2009), ‘DP7331 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures‘, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 7331. CEPR Press, Paris & London. https://cepr.org/publications/dp7331

Factory workers
VoxEU Column

Industry agglomeration and location choice of productive firms: The role of product markets in adverse selection

    ![](../../../../../../../../../../var/folders/34/zq18d8kx7kbgby0j06p_j6t40000gn/T/TemporaryItems/NSIRD_screencaptureui_EM2XPo/Screenshot 2022-01-04 at 17.01.16.png)
  • Industrial organisation
    • ![](../../../../../../../../../../var/folders/34/zq18d8kx7kbgby0j06p_j6t40000gn/T/TemporaryItems/NSIRD_screencaptureui_EM2XPo/Screenshot 2022-01-04 at 17.01.16.png)
  • Productivity and Innovation