DP8029 Non Linear Contracting and Endogenous Buyer Power between Manufacturers and Retailers: Empirical Evidence on Food Retailing in France
|Author(s):||Céline Bonnet, Pierre Dubois|
|Publication Date:||September 2010|
|Keyword(s):||competition, differentiated products, double marginalization, endogenous buyer power, manufacturers, mixed logit, non nested tests, retailers, two part tariffs, vertical contracts, water|
|JEL(s):||C12, C33, L13, L81|
|Programme Areas:||Industrial Organization|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8029|
We present the first empirical estimation of a structural model taking into account explicitly the endogenous buyer power of downstream players facing two part tariffs contracts offered by the upstream level. We consider vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers where resale price maintenance may be used with two part tariffs and allow retailers to have some endogenous buyer power from the horizontal competition of manufacturers. Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins at the upstream and downstream levels in these different structural models using the industry structure and estimates of demand parameters. We apply it to the market of bottled water in France, estimating a mixed logit demand model on individual level data. Empirical evidence shows that two part tariffs contracts are used with no resale price maintenance and that the buyer power of supermarket chains is endogenous to the structure of manufacturers competition.