DP8368 Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China
|Author(s):||Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, Yang Yao|
|Publication Date:||April 2011|
|Keyword(s):||Accountability, Democracy, Institutions, Public Goods|
|Programme Areas:||Development Economics|
|Link to this Page:||www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8368|
We use unique survey data to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. We develop a simple model to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. We exploit variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability.