Fabian Herweg is Professor of International Competition Policy at the University of Bayreuth. In 2009 he received his doctoral degree in economics from the University of Bonn. Fabian is affiliated with CESifo and CEPR. Fabian’s main research interests are (behavioral) contract theory, (behavioral) industrial organisation, and competition policy. He has published numerous articles in journals such as the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, the Journal of the European Economic Association, and the Economic Journal. Currently, I am mainly working on “Context-Dependent Choice under Risk”. Already in the 1980s, due to the popularity of regret theory at that time, economists came to embrace the idea of context-dependent preferences for choice under risk. The interest in context-dependent risk preferences largely abated in the late 1990s because two major challenges were not satisfactorily met. First, with context-dependent risk preferences allowing for intransitivity of pairwise choices, no consensus emerged how to extend these theories beyond pairwise choice. Second, experimental studies documented behavior to be strongly influenced by the format of problem presentation, which was hard to reconcile with any of these theories. The recent introduction of salience theory all of a sudden revived the interest in context-dependent risk-preferences – without, however, addressing these two challenges. My current research will contribute to meeting the challenge of extending context-dependent theories for choice under risk beyond pairwise choice. (i) By systematically exploring choice behavior for rich (i.e. non-binary) choice sets in controlled laboratory experiments; (ii) Theoretically identifying the overlap (or lack thereof) of predictions for rich choice sets under different context-dependent theories; (iii) Identifying the psychological channel that underlies context-dependent risk preferences in order to provide guidance for welfare analysis; (vi) Drawing out the implications of context-dependent risk preferences for incentive provision and insurance decisions with rich choice sets.