Sponsored by the Clausen Center for International Business and Policy at Berkeley and the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Scientific Committee: Christian Keuschnigg (University of St. Gallen and CEPR) and Peter Egger (ETH Zürich and CEPR)

Organisers: Christian Keuschnigg, University of St. Gallen and CEPR (local) and Peter Egger, ETH Zürich and CEPR

We are writing to invite you to submit a paper proposal or express interest in attending the workshop -possibly taking a discussant's role - on 'Business Taxation'. The workshop will take place on Friday -Saturday, 14-15 February 2020 and is hosted by the University of St. Gallen, Switzerland.

The workshop aims to bring together researchers with a focus on business taxation. We aim at a mix of theoretical and empirical studies that explore the effects of business taxation on firm-level decisions and aggregate economic performance. The themes below are indicative:

• Firm-level effects on investment, R&D and employment
• Financial decisions and organisational choice
• Location choice, outsourcing, profit shifting, tax competition
• Internal capital and labor markets and firm-level productivity
• Tax compliance and digital transformation
• Heterogeneous tax effects on entrepreneurial and managerial firms
• Taxation of excess business profit, mark-ups and competition
• Taxation of the financial sector
• Macroeconomic impact of business tax reform
• Design of business tax reform

Keynotes:

Alan Auerbach, University of California at Berkeley, Robert D. Burch Center of Tax Policy and Public Finance,

Michael Devereux, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation and CEPR

We aim at approximately 12 papers with discussants.

Travel and accommodation expenses will be covered according to the https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/CEPR%20TRVL%20GUIDELINES%202018.pdf but if you could contribute to the costs of your attendance from a research grant at your disposal, this would free up funds for someone else. Please indicate in your application whether you will be able to cover your own travel costs, or whether you will require funding.

Authors who are CEPR members can upload their submission on the following registration link https://portal.cepr.org/business-taxation. Please also indicate in your submission whether you would be interested in being a discussant as well. If you are not a CEPR member, please create a CEPR profile at https://portal.cepr.org/user/register and then click on the registration link above to make a submission. If you have any difficulties registering for this meeting, please contact Mandy Chan, Senior Events Officer at [email protected] or +44 20 7183 8804. Please include the paper you wish to submit or indicate if you would like to participate without presenting a paper but possibly acting as a discussant.

If you wish to attend please do ensure that your application and paper reach CEPR by 6pm (UK time), Monday 18 November 2019. We cannot accept submissions received after this date. We aim to notify successful applicants by Monday 2 December 2019.

We invite all researchers with an interest in economic history to submit papers for a conference at New York University Abu Dhabi on 27-29 February 2020. The conference aims to bring together scholars who seek to explain historical phenomena using the methods of the social sciences. The emphasis will be on issues of interdisciplinary concern, including the causes and consequences of institutional development, technology and economic growth, trade and globalisation, and global economic divergence. We anticipate a collection of papers that cross subfields and methods.

The conference will take place at New York University Abu Dhabi. Accommodation during the conference will be provided and there is no registration fee. Assistance with travel expenses will be available and will be allocated on the basis of need: if you require assistance with funding to be able to attend, please make a note of this in the submission form. We would be grateful if participants are able to support any costs themselves, as we will then have a larger budget to support junior scholars.

Submission

Authors who are CEPR members can upload their submission on https://portal.cepr.org/cepr-nyuad-workshop-economic-history. If you do not currently have a CEPR profile, please create a new profile here https://portal.cepr.org/user/register and then click on the registration link above. The deadline for submissions is Friday 13 December 2019.

If you have any difficulties registering for this meeting, please contact Mandy Chan, Senior Events Officer at [email protected] or +44 20 7183 8804.

We will expect accepted participants to submit full papers by Thursday 30 January 2020, so that they can be circulated to all participants.

Scientific Committee:

Roel Beetsma (EFB, ACES, University of Amsterdam and CEPR), Massimo Bordignon (EFB and Catholic University of Milan), Jean Pisani-Ferry (Bruegel, Sciences-Po, and Hertie School), Jeromin Zettelmeyer (Peterson Institute for International Economics and CEPR)

The workshop will explore four main themes:

• The role and design of common European fiscal instruments;
• The relative roles of market discipline and fiscal rules in incentivizing good fiscal policy;
• The aims and design of European fiscal rules.
• The role of national independent fiscal institutions.

The programme committee is seeking theoretical and empirical contributions with an emphasis on policy (design) that help (but need not be limited to) answering the following questions:

1. What, if any, are the welfare and/or stabilization gains of fiscal risk sharing, over and above the benefits of functioning national fiscal stabilizers?

2. How can euro-area fiscal stabilization instruments be designed in a way that does not lead to free riding or moral hazard at the national level?

3. Is there an empirically or theoretically plausible case that euro-area fiscal incentives can be used to overcome reform obstacles at the national level?

4. What, if any, should the functions of a euro-area budget be: stabilization, risk sharing, provision of euro-area public goods (and if so, which?), provision of euro area debt that can be used as safe asset? What size and governance structure would such a budget require?

5. Is there any evidence that markets successfully discipline fiscal policies (e.g. via changes in borrowing costs, or by cutting off reckless governments?)

6. Are there institutional or legal frameworks that might allow successful market discipline while shielding sovereigns from potentially destructive swings in market sentiment?

7. How does the political economy of rules-based and market discipline differ, particularly at a time in the context of rising populism and grievances against "Brussels"?

8. What should be the purpose of euro-area fiscal rules? How does it differ from the purpose of national-level fiscal rules? How, if at all, should the currency union's context affect the aims and design of euro area fiscal rules (for example, positive fiscal spillovers, negative externalities of national fiscal crises, impact on external adjustment and rebalancing between member)? What if any should be the division of labor between euro area and national level fiscal rules, and how can possible inconsistencies be avoided?

9. Should euro area fiscal rules contain an explicit debt anchor; and if so, what is the right anchor? Should it be defined as a fixed share of debt to GDP, or in other ways?

10. Should fiscal rules be amended to make room for public investment - for example, related to climate change mitigation and adaptation? How can the transition to low carbon economies be financed within the fiscal rules?

11. How should euro area fiscal rules be enforced? Should adherence to fiscal rules be a precondition for access to risk-sharing mechanisms?

12. What are the implications of persistently lower real rates for the European fiscal rules? What are the implications of negative real rates for debt targets and the fiscal rules?

13. Should fiscal rules take into account constraints in the exercise of monetary policy (such as the effective lower bounds on policy rates) - and if so, how?

14. Should fiscal rules be replaced with discretionary, but binding fiscal surveillance? If so, what institutional framework/governance structure does this require? What is the role of the national independent fiscal institutions and EU-level surveillance?

Preliminary papers or extended abstracts (about two pages describing aims, methodology, and anticipated results) are requested by Monday 30 September 2019. Successful authors will be notified, with final drafts expected on 31 January 2020. The sponsoring institutions can cover accommodation and travel according to the CEPR Guidelines for presenters and discussants.

Authors who are CEPR members can upload their submission on the following registration link https://portal.cepr.org/rethinking-european-fiscal-framework . Please also indicate in your submission whether you would be interested in being a discussant as well. The organisers will select the papers based on originality, analytical rigor, and policy relevance. If you are not a CEPR member, please create a CEPR profile at https://portal.cepr.org/user/register and then click on the registration link above to make a submission.