Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Provider competition and over-utilization in health care

Author(s): Jan Boone and Rudy Douven

Publication Date: September 2014

Keyword(s): competition, health care, mechanism design, over-utilization and selective contracting

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and Public Economics

Abstract: This paper compares the welfare effects of three ways in which health care can be organized: no competition (NC), competition for the market (CfM) and competition on the market (CoM) where the payer offers the optimal contract to providers in each case. We argue that each of these can be optimal depending on the contracting environment of a speciality. In particular, CfM is optimal in a clinical situation where the payer either has contractible information on provider quality or can enforce cost efficient protocols. If such contractible information is not available NC or CoM can be optimal depending on whether patients react to decentralized information on quality differences between providers and whether payer's and patients' preferences are aligned.

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Bibliographic Reference

Boone, J and Douven, R. 2014. 'Provider competition and over-utilization in health care'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10177