Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP10199 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details

Title: Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection

Author(s): Jan Boone

Publication Date: October 2014

Keyword(s): adverse selection, cost effectiveness, moral hazard, public vs private insurance, universal basic health insurance and voluntary supplementary insurance

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not covered by basic insurance can be covered on the private supplementary insurance market. Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered by basic insurance.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10199

Bibliographic Reference

Boone, J. 2014. 'Basic versus supplementary health insurance: moral hazard and adverse selection'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10199