Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Author(s): Quoc-Anh Do, Yen-Teik Lee and Bang Dang Nguyen

Publication Date: April 2015

Keyword(s): close gubernatorial election, corruption, firm value, political connection, procurement, regression discontinuity design and social networks

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political connections are more valuable for firms connected to winning challengers, for smaller and financially dependent firms, in more corrupt states, in states of connected firms? headquarters and operations, and in closer, smaller, and active networks. Post-election, firms connected to the winner receive significantly more state procurement contracts and invest more than do firms connected to the loser.

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Bibliographic Reference

Do, Q, Lee, Y and Nguyen, B. 2015. 'Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10526