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Title: The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice

Author(s): Monique de Haan, Pieter A. Gautier, Hessel Oosterbeek and Bas van der Klaauw

Publication Date: June 2015

Keyword(s): Boston mechanism, deferred acceptance mechanism, ex-ante efficiency, ex-post efficiency, school choice and strategic behavior

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: Theory points to a potential trade-off between two main school assignment mechanisms; Boston and Deferred Acceptance (DA). While DA is strategy-proof and gives a stable matching, Boston might outperform DA in terms of ex-ante efficiency. We quantify the (dis)advantages of the mechanisms by using information about actual choices under Boston complemented with survey data eliciting students' school preferences. We find that under Boston around 8% of the students apply to another school than their most-preferred school. We compare allocations resulting from Boston with DA with single tie-breaking (one central lottery; DA-STB) and multiple tie-breaking (separate lottery per school; DA-MTB). DA-STB places more students in their top-n schools, for any n, than Boston and results in higher average welfare. We find a trade-off between DA-STB and DA-MTB. DA-STB places more students in their single most-preferred school than DA-MTB, but fewer in their top-n, for n >= 2. Finally, students from disadvantaged backgrounds benefit most from a switch from Boston to any of the DA mechanisms.

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Bibliographic Reference

de Haan, M, Gautier, P, Oosterbeek, H and van der Klaauw, B. 2015. 'The performance of school assignment mechanisms in practice'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.