Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP10751 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

Author(s): Georg Nöldeke and Jorge Peńa

Publication Date: August 2015

Keyword(s): costly voting, mixed strategy equilibrium, participation games and polynomials in Bernstein form

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10751

Bibliographic Reference

Nöldeke, G and Peńa, J. 2015. 'The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10751