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Title: Residual Deterrence

Author(s): Francesc Dilmé and Daniel F Garrett

Publication Date: December 2015

Keyword(s): deterrence, enforcement and reputation

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or "residual deterrence". We provide a theory of residual deterrence which accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. Our theory rests on the costs of reallocating enforcement resources. In light of these costs, we study the determinants of offending such as the role of public information about enforcement and offending.

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Bibliographic Reference

Dilmé, F and Garrett, D. 2015. 'Residual Deterrence'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10994