Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP11111 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Title: How Excessive Is Banks' Maturity Transformation?
Author(s): Anatoli Segura and Javier Suarez
Publication Date: February 2016
Keyword(s): liquidity risk, maturity regulation, pecuniary externalities and systemic crises
Programme Area(s): Financial Economics
Abstract: We quantify the gains from regulating maturity transformation in a model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors' preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. Pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The calibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006 yields that lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion, while the lengthening induced by the NSRF would be too drastic.
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Segura, A and Suarez, J. 2016. 'How Excessive Is Banks' Maturity Transformation?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11111