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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

Author(s): Quoc-Anh Do, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh Tran

Publication Date: February 2016

Keyword(s): authoritarian regime, distributive politics, favoritism, hometown, infrastructure, patronage and political connection

Programme Area(s): Development Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown.

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Bibliographic Reference

Do, Q, Nguyen, K and Tran, A. 2016. 'One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11126