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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants

Author(s): Alessandra Casella, Jean-Francois Laslier and Antonin Macé

Publication Date: May 2016

Keyword(s): Colonel Blotto, Committees, Polarization, Storable Votes and Tyranny of the Majority

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game --- minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably --- the exact choices are of secondary importance.

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Bibliographic Reference

Casella, A, Laslier, J and Macé, A. 2016. 'Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11256