Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

Author(s): Michael Callen, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain and Muhammad Yasir Khan

Publication Date: June 2016

Keyword(s): Absence, Corruption, Data in Policymaking, Information Communication Technology, patronage, Political Competition and Political Connections

Programme Area(s): Development Economics

Abstract: This paper presents evidence that one cause of absenteeism in the public sector is that government jobs are handed out as patronage. First, politicians routinely interfere when bureaucrats sanction absent doctors, and doctors are more absent in uncompetitive constituencies and when connected to politicians. Next, we find that the effects of two experimental interventions to address absence are attenuated in uncompetitive constituencies and for connected doctors. The first is a smartphone monitoring technology that nearly doubles inspection rates, and the second, representing the first experiment on the effects of providing data to policymakers, channels real time information on doctor absence.

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Bibliographic Reference

Callen, M, Gulzar, S, Hasanain, A and Khan, M. 2016. 'The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11321