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Title: A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability

Author(s): Boragan Aruoba, Allan Drazen and Razvan Vlaicu

Publication Date: June 2016

Keyword(s): discipline, elections, maximum likelihood, political agency, selection and structural estimation

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4:2% compared to a one-term regime. JEL

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Bibliographic Reference

Aruoba, B, Drazen, A and Vlaicu, R. 2016. 'A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11331