Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination

Author(s): Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini

Publication Date: February 1995

Keyword(s): Fiscal Policy, Incentives, Monetary Policy and Policy Coordination

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: This paper illustrates some of the most important insights of the literature on international fiscal and monetary policy coordination. It notes that the analysis of international policy interactions is enriched by taking the incentives in the domestic policy process into account. These incentives can either be tied to credibility issues or to political institutions. The paper also focuses on the role of institutions that can enforce and support international cooperation. We discuss alternative task assignments between member countries and the central policy-making level, and alternative processes for collective decision making.

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Bibliographic Reference

Persson, T and Tabellini, G. 1995. 'Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1141