Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP11447 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games

Author(s): Ulrich Doraszelski and Juan Escobar

Publication Date: August 2016

Keyword(s): Dynamic games, Markov perfect equilibrium and Protocol of moves

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: The timing of decisions is an essential ingredient in modelling any strategic situation. Yet, determining the most realistic and appropriate protocol of moves can be challenging. We introduce a class of dynamic stochastic games that we call separable dynamic games with noisy transitions and establish that they are protocol invariant provided that periods are sufficiently short. Protocol invariance means that the set of Markov perfect equilibria is nearly the same irrespective of the order in which players are assumed to move within a period. We also show that the equilibria have a remarkably simple structure.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11447

Bibliographic Reference

Doraszelski, U and Escobar, J. 2016. 'Protocol Invariance and the Timing of Decisions in Dynamic Games'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11447