Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP11527 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details

Title: Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives

Author(s): Zakharov Alexei, Alexander Shapoval and Shlomo Weber

Publication Date: September 2016

Keyword(s): Candidates, Distribution of Ideal Points, Electoral equilibrium, Electoral Game, Rank Objectives and Valence

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: In this paper we examine the effects of valence in a continuous spatial voting model between two incumbent parties and one potential entrant. All parties are rank-motivated and are driven by their place in the electoral competition. One of our main results is that a sufficiently wide valence gap between the incumbents yields an equilibrium in which no entry will occur. We also show that an increase in valence shifts the high-valence incumbent party closer to the median voter, while the low-valence incumbent selects a more extreme platform.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11527

Bibliographic Reference

Alexei, Z, Shapoval, A and Weber, S. 2016. 'Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11527