Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP1178 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Title: Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?
Author(s): Yishay Yafeh and Oved Yosha
Publication Date: May 1995
Keyword(s): Banks, Japanese Corporate Groups, Large Shareholders, Managerial Moral Hazard and Monitoring
Programme Area(s): Financial Economics
Abstract: We investigate the nature of monitoring by stake holders using data on Japanese manufacturing firms. Shareholders and bank-centred corporate groups monitor firms by reducing activities with scope for managerial moral hazard such as advertising, R&D and entertainment expenses. Monitoring of this type takes place even when the monitored firm is not in financial distress. Although in Japan it is difficult to distinguish empirically between monitoring motivated by debt and monitoring motivated by equity stake, the data indicate that shareholders monitor firms continuously, while debt holders may intervene when firm performance is poor.
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Yafeh, Y and Yosha, O. 1995. 'Large Shareholders and Banks: Who Monitors and How?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1178