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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Author(s): Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris

Publication Date: February 2017

Keyword(s): Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure and robust predictions

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: Fixing a game with uncertain payoffs, information design identifies the information structure and equilibrium that maximizes the payoff of an information designer. We show how this perspective unifies existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persua- sion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bergemann, D and Morris, S. 2017. 'Information Design: A Unified Perspective'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11867