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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil

Author(s): Fernanda Brollo, Katja Maria Kaufmann and Eliana La Ferrara

Publication Date: April 2017

Keyword(s):

Programme Area(s): Development Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: We study the implementation of Bolsa Familia, a program that conditions cash transfers to poor families on children's school attendance. Using unique administrative data, we analyze how beneficiaries respond to the enforcement of conditionality. Making use of random variation in the day on which punishments are received, we find that school attendance increases after families are punished for past noncompliance. Families also respond to penalties experienced by peers: a child's attendance increases if her own classmates, but also her siblings' classmates (in other grades or schools), experience enforcement. As the severity of penalties increases with repeated noncompliance, households' response is larger when peers receive a penalty that the family has not (yet) received. We thus find evidence of spillover effects and learning about enforcement.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11965

Bibliographic Reference

Brollo, F, Kaufmann, K and La Ferrara, E. 2017. 'Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=11965