Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP12065 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details

Title: Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening

Author(s): Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka

Publication Date: May 2017

Keyword(s): assessment of research quality, competition between journals, Information Acquisition and simultaneous versus sequential screening

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. Total screening in a duopolistic journal industry exceeds that of a monopoly. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. Interestingly, in the sequential screening model established journal rankings tend to reduce screening incentives. The screening technology determines whether the high-ranked or low-ranked journal have stronger screening incentives, which has implications for the long-run stability of established rankings.

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Bibliographic Reference

Gehrig, T and Stenbacka, R. 2017. 'Journal Competition and the Quality of Published Research: Simultaneous versus Sequential Screening'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12065