Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law

Author(s): Mike Burkart, Salvatore Miglietta and Charlotte Ostergaard

Publication Date: July 2017

Keyword(s): authority allocation, Boards, corporate governance and private contracting

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: We study how owners trade off the costs and benefits of establishing a board in a historical setting, where boards are optional and authority over corporate decisions can be freely allocated across the general meeting, the board, and management. We find that informed owners and boards are substitutes, and that boards exist in firms most prone to collective action problems. Boards monitor, advise, and mediate among shareholders, and these different roles entail different allocations of authority. Boards also arise to balance the need for small shareholder protection with the need to curb managerial discretion.

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Bibliographic Reference

Burkart, M, Miglietta, S and Ostergaard, C. 2017. 'Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12147