Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP12202 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Strategic Sample Selection

Author(s): Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sørensen

Publication Date: August 2017

Keyword(s): Comparison of experiments, Dispersion, Persuasion, Strategic selection and welfare

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This paper develops a notion of multivariate accuracy to characterize the welfare impact of sample selection from a larger presample. Maximal selection benefits or hurts a decision maker with interval dominance ordered preferences if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular-as in location experiments with normal noise-or log-submodular. Applying the result to auctions, we show that under non-pathological conditions the information contained in the winning bids decreases as the number of bidders increases. Exploiting a connection to extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information when the presample size goes to infinity, as under perfect competition. In the context of a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we also derive implications for the design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12202

Bibliographic Reference

Di Tillio, A, Ottaviani, M and Sørensen, P. 2017. 'Strategic Sample Selection'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12202