Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: The Political Economy of Transportation Investment

Author(s): Edward L Glaeser and Giacomo AM Ponzetto

Publication Date: August 2017

Keyword(s): elections, imperfect information, infrastructure, Nuisance mitigation, political economy and Transportation investment

Programme Area(s): International Trade and Regional Economics, Macroeconomics and Growth and Public Economics

Abstract: Will politics lead to over-building or under-building of transportation projects? In this paper, we develop a model of infrastructure policy in which politicians overdo things that have hidden costs and underperform tasks whose costs voters readily perceive. Consequently, national funding of transportation leads to overspending, since voters more readily perceive the upside of new projects than the future taxes that will be paid for distant highways. Yet when local voters are well-informed, the highly salient nuisances of local construction, including land taking and noise, lead to under-building. This framework explains the decline of urban mega-projects in the US (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003) as the result of increasingly educated and organized urban voters. Our framework also predicts more per capita transportation spending in low-density and less educated areas, which seems to be empirically correct.

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Bibliographic Reference

Glaeser, E and Ponzetto, G. 2017. 'The Political Economy of Transportation Investment'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12207