Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP12353 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information

Author(s): Antonio Cabrales, Michalis Drouvelis, Zeynep Gurguc and Indrajit Ray

Publication Date: October 2017

Keyword(s): Battle of the Sexes, cheap talk, coordination and private information

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization, Labour Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: We consider an experiment with a version of the Battle of the Sexes game with two-sided private information, allowing a possible round of either one-way or two-way cheap talk before the game is played. We compare different treatments to study truthful revelation of information and subsequent payoffs from the game. We find that the players are overall truthful about their types in the cheap-talk phase in both one-way or two-way talk. Furthermore, the unique symmetric cheap-talk equilibrium in the two-way cheap talk game is played when they players fully reveal their information; however, they achieve higher payoffs in the game when the talk is one-way as the truthful reports facilitate desired coordination.

For full details and related downloads, please visit:

Bibliographic Reference

Cabrales, A, Drouvelis, M, Gurguc, Z and Ray, I. 2017. 'Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.