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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: The Simple Economics of White Elephants

Author(s): Juan Jose Ganuza Fernandez and Gerard Llobet

Publication Date: January 2018

Keyword(s): Concession contracts, flexible-term concessions and Information Acquisition

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: This paper shows that the concession model discourages firms from acquiring information about the future profitability of a project. Uniformed contractors carry out good and bad projects because they are profitable in expected terms even though it would have been optimal to invest in screening them out according to their value. White elephants are identified as avoidable negative net present-value projects that are nevertheless undertaken. Institutional arrangements that limit the losses that firms can bear exacerbate this distortion. We characterize the optimal concession contract, which fosters the acquisition of information and achieves the first best by conditioning the duration of the concession to the realization of the demand and includes payments for not carrying out some projects.

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Bibliographic Reference

Ganuza Fernandez, J and Llobet, G. 2018. 'The Simple Economics of White Elephants'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12557