Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication

Author(s): Inga Deimen and Dezso Szalay

Publication Date: February 2018

Keyword(s): delegated expertise, delegation, effectiveness of biased communication, endogenous information and strategic information transmission

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: A decision-maker needs to reach a decision and relies on an expert to acquire information. Ideal actions of expert and decision-maker are partially aligned and the expert chooses what to learn about each. The decision-maker can either get advice from the expert or delegate decision-making to him. Under delegation, the expert learns his privately optimal action and chooses it. Under communication, advice based on such information is discounted, resulting in losses from strategic communication. We characterize the communication problems that make the expert acquire information of equal use to expert and decision-maker. In these problems, communication outperforms delegation.

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Bibliographic Reference

Deimen, I and Szalay, D. 2018. 'Delegated Expertise, Authority, and Communication'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12706