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Title: News and Archival Information in Games

Author(s): Ran Spiegler

Publication Date: March 2018

Keyword(s): archival information, causal models, high-order beliefs, maximum entropy and non-rational expectations

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization

Abstract: I enrich the typology of players in the standard model of games with incomplete information, by allowing them to have incomplete "archival information" - namely, piecemeal knowledge of correlations among relevant variables. A player is characterized by the conventional Harsanyi type (a.k.a "news-information") as well as the novel "archive-information", formalized as a collection of subsets of variables. The player can only learn the marginal distributions over these subsets of variables. The player extrapolates a well-specified probabilistic belief according to the maximum-entropy criterion. This formalism expands our ability to capture strategic situations with "boundedly rational expectations." I demonstrate the expressive power and use of this formalism with some examples.

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Bibliographic Reference

Spiegler, R. 2018. 'News and Archival Information in Games'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12805