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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union

Author(s): Roel Beetsma and A Lans Bovenberg

Publication Date: November 1995

Keyword(s): Convergence, European Central Bank, European Monetary Union, Inflation Aversion, Optimal Institutions and Structural Policies

Programme Area(s): International Macroeconomics

Abstract: This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the Union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the Union.

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Bibliographic Reference

Beetsma, R and Bovenberg, A. 1995. 'Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1303