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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan

Author(s): Ruben Enikolopov

Publication Date: July 2018

Keyword(s): democratization, field experiment, governance quality and Political Institutions

Programme Area(s): Development Economics and Public Economics

Abstract: Using data from a field experiment across 500 villages in Afghanistan, we study how electoral accountability of local institutions affects the quality of governance. In villages with newly created elected councils, food aid distributed by local leaders is more likely to reach needy villagers. However, this effect is observed only if the council is mandated to be the entity responsible for managing the distribution. In the absence of such a mandate the presence of elected councils increases embezzlement without improving aid targeting. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, unclear and overlapping mandates may increase rent-seeking and worsen governance outcomes.

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Bibliographic Reference

Enikolopov, R. 2018. 'Do Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in Afghanistan'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13053