Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP1312 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: The Bargaining Family Revisited

Author(s): Kai A. Konrad and Kjell Erik Lommerud

Publication Date: January 1996

Keyword(s): Education and Family Bargaining

Programme Area(s): Human Resources

Abstract: We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall back. Several authors have claimed that non-cooperative behaviour is a more appropriate fall back in family bargaining than utilities as single. We argue that the empirical implications of the two approaches are quite parallel. A second finding is that over-investment in education may be even more of a problem in our mixed cooperative-non-cooperative model than in a fully non-cooperative one.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1312

Bibliographic Reference

Konrad, K and Lommerud, K. 1996. 'The Bargaining Family Revisited'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1312