Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment

Author(s): Helios Herrera, Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Joseph C. McMurray

Publication Date: October 2018

Keyword(s): information aggregation, laboratory experiment, Majority Rule, Proportional representation and Turnout

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: This paper documents a laboratory experiment that analyses voter participation in common interest proportional representation (PR) elections, comparing this with majority rule. Consistent with theoretical predictions, poorly informed voters in either system abstain from voting, thereby shifting weight to those who are better informed. A dilution problem makes mistakes especially costly under PR, so abstention is higher in PR in contrast with private interest environments, and welfare is lower. Deviations from Nash equilibrium predictions can be accommodated by a logit version of quantal response equilibrium (QRE), which allows for voter mistakes.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13280

Bibliographic Reference

Herrera, H, Llorente-Saguer, A and McMurray, J. 2018. 'Information Aggregation and Turnout in Proportional Representation: A Laboratory Experiment'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13280