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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Equitable Voting Rules

Author(s): Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz and Leeat Yariv

Publication Date: November 2018

Keyword(s): equity, Finite Groups, May's Theorem, Social Choice and Voting rules

Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and Public Economics

Abstract: A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem (May, 1952), providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bartholdi, L, Hann-Caruthers, W, Josyula, M, Tamuz, O and Yariv, L. 2018. 'Equitable Voting Rules'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13316