Citation

Discussion Paper Details

Please find the details for DP13357 in an easy to copy and paste format below:

Full Details   |   Bibliographic Reference

Full Details

Title: Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy

Author(s): Paolo Berta, Gianni De Fraja and Stefano Verzillo

Publication Date: December 2018

Keyword(s): Cream skimming, Hospitals, Lombardy, Optimal healthcare contracts and Patients choice

Programme Area(s): Public Economics

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13357

Bibliographic Reference

Berta, P, De Fraja, G and Verzillo, S. 2018. 'Optimal Healthcare Contracts: Theory and Empirical Evidence from Italy'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13357