Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

Author(s): Pietro Bonetti, Miguel Duro and Gaizka Ormazabal

Publication Date: January 2019

Keyword(s): Acquisitions, Disclosure regulation, market for corporate control, mergers, Proprietary costs and Takeover laws

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.

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Bibliographic Reference

Bonetti, P, Duro, M and Ormazabal, G. 2019. 'Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13458