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Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Tax administration and compliance: evidence from medieval Paris

Author(s): Al Slivinski and Nathan Sussman

Publication Date: February 2019

Keyword(s): compliance, evasion, Fairness, institutions, middle ages, Paris and taxation

Programme Area(s): Economic History

Abstract: We analyze the Parisian taille of the late 13th century - a taxation mechanism used to finance periodic major expenditures by the French Crown, including wars. Our major finding is that this system was remarkably successful along a number of dimensions, in an environment without the administrative structures used by contemporary governments. The taille's essential features were; an agreement between the king and city government to collect a fixed amount of revenue, and a collection process that made use of information about taxpayers held by their fellow artisans and/or neighbors. We show that it collected considerable sums without social unrest, with high levels of compliance, and administrative costs that were low even by modern standards. We also argue that its success may have lessons for improved tax collection and compliance in contemporary less-developed economies.

For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13512

Bibliographic Reference

Slivinski, A and Sussman, N. 2019. 'Tax administration and compliance: evidence from medieval Paris'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13512