Discussion Paper Details
Please find the details for DP13755 in an easy to copy and paste format below:
Title: Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?
Author(s): Mathias Reynaert and James Sallee
Publication Date: May 2019
Keyword(s): automobiles, Carbon Emissions, corrective taxation, Environmental Regulation, fuel economy, Gaming and Goodhart's Law
Programme Area(s): Industrial Organization and Public Economics
Abstract: Firms sometimes comply with externality-correcting policies by gaming the measure that determines policy. This harms consumers by eroding information, but it benefits them when cost savings are passed through into prices. We develop a model that highlights this tension and use it to analyze gaming of automobile carbon emission ratings in the EU. We document startling increases in gaming using novel data. We then analyze the effects of gaming in calibrated simulations. Over a wide range of parameters, we find that pass through substantially outweighs information distortions; on net, consumers benefit from gaming, even when they are fooled by it.
For full details and related downloads, please visit: https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13755
Reynaert, M and Sallee, J. 2019. 'Who Benefits When Firms Game Corrective Policies?'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13755