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Title: Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies

Author(s): Thomas Connelly and Christian C Wolff

Publication Date: July 2019

Keyword(s): agency conflicts, control, Family ownership and Payout policy

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics

Abstract: In this paper we examine the relationship between ownership concentration and dividend policy for Thai publicly listed companies. High family ownership firms have higher dividend payouts than low family ownership firms, which we interpret to mean high family ownership firms follow a more rational dividend policy. This finding is consistent with the prediction that agency conflicts between the managers and shareholders are lower at firms with a controlling shareholder. The evidence is robust through different econometric specifications, robust when the level used to determine the extent of family ownership (family control) is lowered to 10 percent of the outstanding shares, and robust to the inclusion of the ownership wedge as a proxy for the severity of agency conflicts.

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Bibliographic Reference

Connelly, T and Wolff, C. 2019. 'Dividend Policy Decisions and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Thai Public Companies'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13854