Citation

Discussion Paper Details

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Title: Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets

Author(s): Vasso Ioannidou, Nicola Pavanini and Yushi Peng

Publication Date: August 2019

Keyword(s): asymmetric information, Collateral, credit markets and structural estimation

Programme Area(s): Financial Economics and Industrial Organization

Abstract: We study the benefits and costs of collateral requirements in bank lending markets with asymmetric information. We estimate a structural model of firms' credit demand for secured and unsecured loans, banks' contract offering and pricing, and firm default using detailed credit registry data in a setting where asymmetric information problems in credit markets are pervasive. We provide evidence that collateral mitigates adverse selection and moral hazard. With counterfactual experiments, we quantify how an adverse shock to collateral values propagates to credit supply, credit allocation, interest rates, default, and bank profits and how the severity of adverse selection influences this propagation.

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Bibliographic Reference

Ioannidou, V, Pavanini, N and Peng, Y. 2019. 'Collateral and Asymmetric Information in Lending Markets'. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research. https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=13905